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Wrongful Life-Impaired Infant's Cause of 
Action Recognized: Curlender v. Bio-Science 
Laboratories 
Wrongful life1 actions in behalf of physically or mentally 
impaired infants have been consistently barred in all jurisdic- 
tions where brought,' including Calif~rnia.~ Although the factual 
contexts have varied, the courts have uniformly held that the 
infant plaintiffs have suffered no injury cognizable at law.' The 
1. The term "wrongful life" has been applied to both infants' and parents' causes of 
action in various factual contexts since 1963. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 
240, 190 N.E. 2d 849, appeal denied, 27 Ill. 2d 626 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 
(1964) (healthy infant sued father because infant was born an adulterine bastard); 
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967) (parents and defective infant sued 
physician for failure to inform parents of possible birth defects); Speck v. Finegold, 408 
A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (parents and defective infant sued physician for unsuc- 
cessful sterilization and abortion). Regardless of the context, the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant either failed to prevent the infant's birth or denied the parents their right to 
prevent it. Most courts today limit their usage of "wrongful life" to actions brought in 
behalf of the infant and distinguish the parents' action for the same wrong as one for 
"wrongful birth" or "wrongful conception." See, eg., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 423, 
404 A.2d 8, 9-10 (1979); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). The 
case which is the subject of this Casenote limits the term wrongful life "to th- causes 
of action brought by the infant alleging that, due to the negligence of the defendant, 
b i i  occurred." Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 817, 165 
Cal. Rptr. 477, 481, hearing denied, No. 2 Civ. 68192 Div. 1 (Cal. Sept. 4, 1980). 
Care should be taken to distinguish wrongful life causes of action from prenatal tort 
claims. While wrongful life actions have been consistently denied, prenatal tort claims 
are commonly recognized by the courts. See 43 C.J.S. Infants 8 219 (1978). The plaintiff 
in a prenatal tort case alleges not that he was wrongfully born, but that absent the de- 
fendant's negligence either prior to conception or during pregnancy, he would have been 
born normal and healthy. E.g., Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (in- 
fant stated cause of action for injuries resulting from negligent Caesarean section on the 
mother two years before infant's birth). In a wrongful life case there is no claim that the 
defendant caused or increased the risk of the infant's defect, only that he failed to pre- 
vent the infant's birth. Eg., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 427, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979). 
2. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Elliott v. 
Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ah. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); 
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. 
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 
1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). 
3. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). "No court has 
yet recognized the tort [citation omitted], and we are not persuaded that this court 
should be the first." Id. at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656. 
4. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,429,404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Speck v. F i e -  
gold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
6761 CASENOTES 677 
courts have concluded that it is impossible to determine whether 
nonexistence is preferable to impaired life and therefore whether 
impaired life represents a compensable injury.' The court in 
Curlender u. Bio-Science Laboratories6 perceived no such im- 
possibility and, holding contrary to every other standing deci- 
sion on wrongful life, recognized the infant plaintiffs cause of 
action. The California Supreme Court's denial of the defendants' 
petition for hearing suggests that the decision is more than a 
mere aberration.? 
In 1977, Hyam and Phillis Curlender retained the defendant 
laboratories to perform blood tests designed to reveal whether 
they carried genes that could cause Tay-Sachs disease8 in their 
offspring. Relying on the defendants' negative findings: Mrs. 
Curlender conceived and gave birth to the plaintiff, Shauna. 
Shortly after her birth, doctors found that Shauna had Tay- 
Sachs disease. The impaired infant, by and through her father, 
filed a complaint for wrongful lifel0 against the testing laborato- 
ries, alleging that their negligence in giving "incorrect and inac- 
curate" information to her parents was the proximate cause of 
her birth and subsequent suffering.ll 
The defendants demurred to the complaint, arguing that 
5. See note 35 infra. 
6. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,165 Cal. Rptr. 477, hearing denied, No. 2 Civ. 58192 Div. 1 
(Cal. Sept. 4, 1980). 
7. The petition for hearing was denied September 4, 1980. No. 2 Civ. 58192 Div. 1 
(Cal. Sept. 4, 1980). For interpretation of such a denial, see Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 
Cal. App. 3d 346, 351, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56, 60 (1975) (quoting Di Genova v. State Bd. of 
Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178, 367 P.2d 865, 871, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1962)) (although 
denial does not express approval, it is "not without significance"); Allstot v. Long Beach, 
104 Cal. App. 2d 441, 446, 231 P.2d 498, 501 (1951) (denial means lower court did not 
decide incorrectly). But see People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 890, 506 P.2d 232, 236, 106 
Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1973) (under some circumstances such a denial "is to be given no 
weight"). 
8. A fatal, hereditary disease of the nervous system that develops soon after birth 
and has a 25% probability of occurring in the offspring of Eastern European Jewish 
parents when both are carriers of Tay-Sachs genes. 
9. The defendants allegedly represented to the plaintiffs parents that only one of 
them carried Tay-Sachs genes and thus dispelled their concern about possibly impaired 
offspring. Opening Brief for Appellant a t  3, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 
Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). 
10. The "wrongful life" characterization of the action was applied by both the trial 
court and court of appeal. 106 Cal. App. 3d at  817,165 Cal. Rptr. at 481. A simultaneous 
action for "wrongful birth" was filed by the infant's parents. Id. at  817 n.7, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. at 481 n.7. See also Opening Brief for Appellant at  5 n.1. Both actions allege that if 
the parents had been informed of the probability of impaired offspring they would have 
prevented conception or obtained an abortion. 
11. 106 Cal. App. 3d at  815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  480. 
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Stills v. Gratton12 was controlling. Stills denied wrongful life re- 
covery to a healthy infant born following an unsuccessful abor- 
tion, because his only injury was illegitimate birth. The trial 
court in Curlender sustained the demurrer without leave to 
amend and dismissed the complaint. Because of this procedural 
disposition, the court of appeal accepted as true all material 
facts properly pleaded? Therefore, negligence was presumed, 
and the only question was whether the plaintiff had stated a 
cause of action. 
The court of appeal determined that Stills was not control- 
ling and treated the Curlender case as one of first impression.14 
The court reasoned that the Stills infant was born healthy and 
thus suffered no injury; whereas the Curlender infant was born 
with painful defects, a very real injury." With Stills distin- 
guished, the court went on to hold that the defendants had 
breached a duty of reasonable care owed directly to the not-yet- 
conceived infant and that the breach had resulted in the plain- 
tiffs birth with painful defects.16 The difficult question was 
whether that injury is cognizable at law.'' Holding that it is, the 
court reasoned that a wrongful life plaintiff does not claim a 
right not to be born;18 therefore, it is immaterial that the plain- 
tiff would not exist absent the defendants' negligence,ls and no 
comparison of nonlife to impaired life is necessary. What is im- 
portant, reasoned the court, is that "a plaintiff both exists and 
suffers, due to the negligence of others,'n0 and so "may recover 
from the person in fault a compensation therefor.'"' Thus the 
court subordinated the difficult metaphysical questions of 
wrongful life recovery to "the principle that there should be a 
remedy for every wrong ~ommitted."~~ 
The Curlender court characterized Shauna's injury as birth 
with defects," but then focused on the pain and suffering of the 
12. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rtpr. 652 (1976) (the only California wrongful l i e  
case prior to Curlender). 
13. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80. 
14. Id. at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479. 
15. Id. at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
16. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
19. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89 (quoting CAI,. CIV. CODE 5 3281 (West 1970)). 
22. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
23. Id. at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
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defects while ignoring the noncognizable nature of the birth. 
This characterization gave the injury the appearance of a cogni- 
zable prenatal tort and freed the court to allow recovery. This 
analysis and treatment of the injury led the court to an errone- 
ous distinction of Stills, a questionable conclusion on causation, 
and a judicial declaration that nonlife may he preferable to a life 
with defects. 
The rationale given in Stills for denial of the infant's claim 
was not that he had suffered no injury, but that the injury he 
had suffered was not cognizable at law." In Zepeda v. Zeped~,~ '  
which also denied a healthy, illegitimate infant's cIaim of wrong- 
ful life, the court outlined the disadvantages of illegitimacy and 
observed that "it would be pure fiction to say that the plaintiff 
suffers no injury."26 The infant's claim in each case was denied 
because the negligence complained of resulted not only in their 
illegitimacy, but also in their life; and to compensate impaired 
life would have "vast" legal implications and a "staggering" so- 
cial impact.07 
Wrongful life cases present the difficult question of whether 
the defendant, who concededly caused the birth, can also be said 
to have caused the defect that accompanied the birth. Although 
the Curlender court found causation by treating the birth and 
defect jointly as one injury? other courts distinguish the two 
elements and refuse to attribute the defect to the defendant's 
conduct. In Berman v. Allan,m@ the infant alleged through her 
guardian ad litem that she was born with Down's Syndrome due 
to the defendant doctors' failure to inform her parents of the 
availability of amniocentesis. In denying her action, the court 
noted that the defendants neither caused "the mongoloid condi- 
tion nor increased the risk that such a condition would occur."S0 
The court in Becker v. SchwartzS1 reached the same conclusion 
24. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 705-06, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57. 
25. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, appeal denied, 27 Ill. 2d 626 (1963), cert. 
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). 
26. Id. at 255, 190 N.E.2d at 856. 
27. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (quoting 41 Ill. App. 2d at 258, 190 
N.E.2d at 858). Zepeda warned that recovery would encourage litigation by "all others 
born into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse." 41 Ill. App. 2d at 
260, 190 N.E.2d at 858. 
28. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
29. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
30. Id. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11. 
31. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). 
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on similar facts.82 One justice, concurring with the majority on 
this issue, observed: "The heart of the problem in these cases is 
that the physician cannot be said to have caused the defect. The 
disorder is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently 
inflicted by the doct~r.'"~ Thus, while the Curlender concept of 
a "causal link"" between the negligence and the defect is plausi- 
ble, most courts, like Berman and Becker, employ the language 
of "proximate cause" or "cause in fact." In these more common 
terms the defendants' conduct is superseded by the parents' own 
genes as the cause of the defect, and the finding of causation in 
Cur lender becomes questionable. 
Whether the defendant laboratories "caused" only the 
plaintiffs birth or whether they "caused" the plaintiffs birth 
with defects, the court erred in declaring the injury cognizable at 
law. To award damages for impaired life is to make the determi- 
nation that nonlife is preferable, and that determination re- 
quires a comparison between nonlife and impaired life that no 
court is capable of making. Such a comparison "transcends the 
mechanical application of legal  principle^"^^ and would be better 
left to "the representatives of the people."s6 
The Curlender court misinterpreted this judicial reluctance 
to attempt a comparison of nonlife and impaired life as an in- 
ability to measure damagess7 and argued that such an excuse is 
insufficient to bar recovery to an injured plaintiff. However, the 
reason for denial of wrongful life claims is not so much the diffi- 
32. Id. at 410-11, 386 N.E.2d at  811-12, 413 N.Y.S.2d at  899-900. 
33. Id. at 418, 386 N.E.2d at  816, 413 N.Y.S.2d at  904 (Wachtler, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Accord, Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654,655 (N.D. 
Ohio 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 770-71, 233 N.W.2d 372, 374 
(1975). 
34. 106 Cal. kpp. 3d at  828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
35. 46 N.Y.2d at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810,413 N.Y.S.2d at  898. The Stills court con- 
cluded: "The issue involved is more theological or philosophical than legal." 55 Cal. App. 
3d at  705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at  656. See also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 
689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part). "Ultimately, the infant's complaint 
is that he would be better off not to have been born. Man, who knows nothing of death 
or nothingness, cannot possibly know whether that is so." Id. 
36. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d at  263, 190 N.E.2d at 859. Accord, Park v. 
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 91-92, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116-17 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting), 
modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Cf. Speck v. Finegold, 
408 A.2d 496, 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (discusses how wrongful death was first recog- 
nized through the legislature rather than through the courts). 
37. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  482 (interpretation of rationale in 
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)); Id. at 824-25, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  
486 (interpretation of rationale in Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 
652 (1976)). 
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culty of measuring or computing damagess8 as it is the difficulty 
of determining whether damages are due. If courts could deter- 
mine that an infant has suffered a compensable injury by being 
born, mere difficulty in computing damages "would not bar 
re~overy."~~ 
Some commentators concede that the injury alleged in 
wrongful life cases is birth, but suggest that courts should not 
blindly presume that life is always preferable to nonlife.'O They 
cite recent right-to-die cases4' as evidence of a new willingness 
by the courts to conclude that under some circumstances nonlife 
or death is preferable to a painful, miserable life. However, a 
closer comparison of the two types of cases reveals a lifetime of 
difference. 
Right-to-die cases normally deal with noncognitive, vegeta- 
tive patients who are being kept "alive" by various artificial in- 
struments. The issue is not their preference (nor their guardian's 
preference) for death, but rather their right of privacy, their 
right to be free from nonconsensual invasion of their bodily in- 
t e g r i t ~ . ~ ~  As the condition worsens and more artificial interven- 
tion is required, a point is reached where the individual's right 
of privacy exceeds the state's interest in preserving life." At that 
point courts recognize a right to die. By constrast, since a wrong- 
ful life plaintiff complains of life, he necessarily claims a right 
not to be born? a right which no court has recogni~ed.~~ 
38. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hap., 451 F. Supp. 692,694 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 
(also involved an infant born with Tay-Sachs); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 428-29,404 
A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 483-84, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344, 276 
N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (1966). 
39. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 80-81 n.3, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 n.3 (1977). 
40. Comment, Berman v. Allan, 8 HOPSTRA L. REV. 257, 263-64 (1979); Comment, 
"Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 496-98 (1980); Note, 
A Cause of Action For "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 
65-66 (1970). 
41. See, eg., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 922 (1976). 
42. "It ia the issue of the constitutional right of privacy that has given us most con- 
cern, in the exceptional circumstances of this case." In  re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at  38, 355 
A.2d at  662. 
43. Id. a t  40-41, 355 A.2d a t  664. 
44. Curlender erroneously denied that such a claim was at  issue. 106 Cal. App. 3d at  
830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  489. 
45. "Fundamental to the recognition of such a cause of action is the notion that the 
defendant has violated some legal right of plaintiff's . . . . However, a legal right not to 
be born is alien to the public policy of this State to protect and preserve human life." 
Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 ( A h  1978). Accord, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 
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Furthermore, a court's order granting permission to remove 
artificial life supports is not a judicial declaration that death is 
preferable to a vegetative existence, but merely a granting of 
agency allowing an individual to thus exercise his rights if he so 
chooses. There is no compulsion, and no monetary award nor 
compensation is involved. By contrast, when a court awards 
damages to an impaired infant born because of negligence, it 
rules that the defendants should have prevented the birth and 
that nonlife would have been preferable. In other words, allow- 
ance of wrongful life recovery prefers nonlife by penalizing the 
failure to prevent life. Allowing a person to choose to die states 
no preference and penalizes no one." 
One of the most dangerous effects of the Curlender decision 
is its possible impact on parents' rights and family relationships. 
By declaring impaired life a cognizable injury, the court opened 
the door to suits by impaired children against their parents. 
Curlender called such a concern "gro~ndless,"~~ but in the same 
paragraph the court conceded that if parents are adequately in- 
formed of the risks of impaired offspring and then choose to 
conceive and give life anyway, "we see no sound public policy 
which should protect those parents from being answerable'' to 
their offspring? Fear of a lawsuit could deter from parenthood 
those persons who desire to accept the known risks of bearing 
impaired children4@ and thus infringes their right of procreative 
choice. Such persons, if they did conceive and were informed of 
an impaired fetus, could be forced into an abortion to avoid the 
potential costs of litigation and thus forced as well against their 
possible religious convi~tions.~~ These concerns are valid, not 
"groundless." 
The Curlender court was motivated in its decision by a de- 
sire to deter negligent genetic counseling and by the moral prin- 
ciple that every wrong should have a remedy. However, both 
401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978). 
46. The courts also distinguish between the two types of actions. The same court 
that granted the right to die in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 922 (1976), also denied the infant's claim of wrongful life in Berman v. Allan three 
years later. See also Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of 
Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1502 n.56 (1978). 
47. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
48. Id. 
49. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858. 
50. Brief of Amici Curiae at 16-17, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. 
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). 
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ends may be satisfied without granting recovery to the infant. 
The parents of the Curlender infant brought a separate action 
in their own behalf for "wrongful birth."51 Unlike wrongful life 
actions, such parental actions are commonly recognized in Cali- 
fornia5' and other jurisdi~tions.~~ This wide acceptance indicates 
that most courts consider recovery of damages by the parents as 
adequately satisfying the requirements of both deterrence and 
justice. 
Some would argue that allowing only the parents to recover 
still leaves uncompensated the pain and suffering of the im- 
paired infant.- However, the law has long recognized that some 
of life's adversities will always to uncompensated as damnum 
absque injuria, damage without wrong.55 The fact that a com- 
plainant may have suffered is not enough. There must be a vio- 
lation of a legal right or there is no cause of action. As the court 
noted in Howard u. Lecher? "Ideally, there should be a remedy 
for every wrong. This is not the function of the law, however, for 
'[elvery injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of 
the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the 
legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.' "" 
Merrill F. Nelson 
51. Opening Brief for Appellant at  5 n.1. 
52. In both Stills and Custodio v. Baur, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 
(1967), the parents were allowed recovery for all consequential damages. 
53. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 
1978) (Tay-Sachs case in which the parents were allowed recovery while the infant's ac- 
tion was denied); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
54. This is not entirely true since the typical juror may have in mind the pain and 
suffering of the infant when determining a fair award for the parenta. 
55. 1 AM. JUR. 2d Actions § 70 (1962). 
56. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (Tay-Sachs case that 
denied parents damages for emotional suffering; lower court's grant of medical costs and 
funeral expenses was not appealed). 
57. Id. at  113, 366 N.E.2d a t  66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 
24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969)). 
